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1 Introduction1
Social scientists are becoming increasingly interested in virtual worlds, three-2
dimensional environments in which communities of networked individuals in-3
teract (Castranova, 2005; Bainbridge, 2007; Bloomfield, 2007). There are two4
reasons. First, the growing number of users and the scope and nature of socio-5
economic activity between them are seen as interesting phenomena that merit6
investigation in their own right (Castranova, 2005). Virtual worlds present7
evolving cultures with independent social institutions that are becoming more8
significant to society at large (Noveck, 2004). In economic terms, their evo-9
lution from specialised video game networks to general social platforms has10
generated a global industry of firms that leverage installed user bases for sub-11
scription fees, advertising opportunities or virtual support services (Cagnina12
and Poian, 2007). Many virtual worlds have evolving economies with fully con-13
vertible currencies as well as functioning financial, labour and product markets14
that are capable of producing a host of micro and macroeconomic phenomena15
(Guest, 2007).16
Second, the computer technology underlying virtual worlds provides novel17
methods of conducting social science research (Bainbridge, 2007). To begin18
with, it facilitates the economical and large-scale recruitment of diverse sub-19
jects from different cultural-geographical and socio-economic groups for par-20
ticipation in interviews, focus groups, surveys or experiments. In addition,21
it affords control of the environment in which they decide and interact that22
can be used to manipulate decision conditions, observe behaviour and collect23
data. Conversely, however, both these features also present potential method-24
ological problems. As subjects, virtual world users may not reflect standard25
populations in terms of demographic or cultural characteristics and there-26
fore may display different behaviours. The electronic interface that moderates27
communication and interaction between them precludes physiological signals28
and proximity that moderate economic behaviour in physical settings. Vir-29
tual world culture, social institutions and conventions that evolve as a result30
may shape economic interactions in ways that differ from traditional social31
settings. The anonymity of the interface may hamper quality control in the32
data collection process.33
The current study is intended as a first, exploratory step towards the method-34
ological issue. While virtual worlds may provide useful research tools for a35
number of social science disciplines, we concentrate here on their potential as36
platforms for designing and conducting economic experiments, an area which37
may be especially conducive to benefit from the new methods virtual worlds of-38
fer (Bainbridge, 2007; Castranova, 2006). Traditional experimental economics39
involves testing economic theories by observing the incentivised decisions of40
representative subjects under choice conditions systematically manipulated in41
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laboratory settings. Virtual worlds may provide opportunities for methodolog-42
ical innovation here. The discipline has recently begun to broaden its scope43
by exploring new methods and applications outside the standard controlled44
laboratory environment commonly populated by Western student subjects.45
There are two related ways in which experimentalists are trying to improve46
the realism of the behaviour they observe. First, field studies in naturalistic47
settings are being proposed as a way of avoiding the distorting effects artificial48
laboratory settings may have on subject behaviour (Harrison and List, 2004).49
Second, new recruitment techniques and sampling locations are being used50
to overcome the reliance of experimentalists on Western university students51
to generate results (Anderhub et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2004, e.g.). Virtual52
worlds may give an opportune impetus to both of these concerns. First, due53
to their computerised interfaces, they may provide relatively controlled en-54
vironments for conducting experiments while remaining within a naturalistic55
setting familiar to subjects. Second, virtual worlds may be inhabited by a56
wider cross section of people such that sampling from different cultures and57
more heterogeneous backgrounds may be possible in a single location acces-58
sible to experimentalists. In this sense, virtual worlds may bridge the gap59
between laboratory experiments and field studies, allowing researchers to use60
representative subjects in more natural environments to study the relationship61
between the conditions of interaction and the evolution of social institutions62
in a controlled manner.63
We assess to what extent virtual worlds can be used in this context. We ap-64
proach the issue in two ways, by replication and by observation. First, virtual65
world experimentation can be a useful, alternative experimental tool to the66
extent that the results it generates for particular tasks and conditions are the67
same as those generated by traditional experimental methods. We assess this68
aspect by conducting virtual experiments with a range of standard tasks in69
standard conditions and comparing virtual subject behaviour with that of tra-70
ditional pools reported in existing work. The suitability of virtual experimenta-71
tion as an alternative would be supported to the extent that no differences are72
found. As the observed subject behaviour may be related to their underlying73
culture, demographics and values, we also used a survey instrument to collect74
data on these which can be compared to standard populations. The difference75
or similarity of virtual users to these provides additional insight into their76
suitability as experimental subjects representative of economic agents gener-77
ally. This first part of our approach tests the scope virtual worlds hold for78
traditional economic experimentation, rather than for new avenues of experi-79
mental research they may promise. We conceive of it as measuring the ‘output’80
of the virtual experimentation method. The second part of our approach is81
more qualitative and focuses on its ‘input’ side. This involves gathering in-82
formal insights about the practical feasibility of economic experimentation in83
virtual environments from the process of conducting experiments. We hoped84
to learn by observation to what extent virtual worlds can provide a suitable85
3
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platform for experimental research generally, what the advantages and disad-86
vantages are, and what modifications may be made to render virtual worlds87
more amenable to experimentation. This second part may also provide in-88
sights into what opportunities for new research approaches or methods virtual89
worlds hold.90
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss91
the features of virtual worlds, their significance for experimentalists and our92
procedure of methodologically assessing them. The results we obtained are93
reported in section 3. Section 4 discusses our general observations from the94
experiment in terms of the methodological issues we consider. The final section95
contains concluding remarks.96
2 Virtual Experimentation97
2.1 Virtual Worlds98
While there is considerable variation between the many alternative virtual99
worlds that exist, they typically reproduce features of the physical world such100
as a three-dimensional topography containing virtual objects obeying simu-101
lated physical laws as well as the possibility of communication, social interac-102
tion and economic exchange between users virtually represented by avatars.103
We chose Second Life (SL, see Linden-Labs 2008) as the virtual platform for104
our study. At the time of writing (November 2008), SL has over 15.7 million105
registered avatars. 1 Accounting for multiple and dormant registrations, there106
are an estimated one million regular users who spend over twenty million hours107
logged in per month. Between twenty and thirty thousand users are online at108
any one time. In terms of demographics, the majority of these are from popu-109
lous and industrialised countries including the USA, the UK, Germany, Brazil,110
France and Japan, with a median age of 36 and 57% being male.111
SL is divided into individual sectors with topographical features in which112
avatars can operate, including oceans, rivers, mountains and beaches as well113
as flora. A typical location is displayed in figure 1. Avatars are capable of loco-114
motion, including walking, running and flying and are immune to destruction.115
They communicate using instant text messaging (IM) and can signal voice116
intonation such as whispering and shouting as well as use gestures and body117
language. Public IM can be received by all avatars in the vicinity, while private118
IM is transmitted only between two avatars irrespective of location. Internet119
1 Economic and general statistics concerning SL are available at:
http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy.php and http://blog.secondlife.com/.
4
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Fig. 1. Typical SL-screenshot showing the user’s avatar (male foreground figure),
the surrounding SL-environment and interface controls along the bottom.
telephony has recently been introduced to SL. Users can edit the appearance120
of avatars in terms of physical features, clothing and assessories. As a result,121
avatars can assume the form of humans, animals, fantasy creatures or objects.122
Avatars are associated with user accounts that include money balances in Lin-123
den dollars (L$) which can be bought from or sold to Linden Lab, the creators124
and owners of SL, at a relatively stable exchange rate of about 270 L$ per125
1 U.S. dollar. A total of 5.3 billion L$ (U.S. $19.7 million) are currently in126
circulation. SL provides an interface feature that allows immediate and direct127
account-to-account transfers. These balances can be used to purchase a port-128
folio of tradable virtual objects including land, buildings, vehicles, clothing,129
accessories and tools.130
2.2 Experimental Economics131
Virtual worlds such as SL may have potential as powerful new platforms for132
designing and conducting experimental research. Bainbridge (2007) makes the133
following case:134
Virtual worlds such as SL provide environments and tools that facilitate135
creating online laboratories that can automatically recruit potentially thou-136
sands of research subjects, over a period of months, at low cost. SL offers137
scripting and graphics tools that allow anyone to build a virtual laboratory138
building, functioning equipment to run the experiment, and incentives to139
5
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motivate participation. (p. 473)140
Conversely, however, the very technology that generates these advantages may141
give rise to a number of a priori concerns about virtual experimentation. Prin-142
cipally, experimenters know little about the identity or state of the subjects143
who control the participating avatars. This may make it difficult to recruit144
appropriate subjects, to ensure discipline in the virtual laboratory, to prevent145
repeat participation and subject collusion and to engender subjects’ trust and146
confidence in the experiment. There is a possibility of demographic or cul-147
tural idiosyncrasies of virtual subjects generally. This may generate a sample148
bias that renders virtual experimentation inappropriate to test general eco-149
nomic theories. They may have more hedonistic or short-term tendencies or150
show less conformity than the average person. In addition, virtual behaviour151
is not moderated by physical presence and may therefore not be comparable152
to traditionally-generated results.153
2.3 Experimental Design154
The purpose of our study is to conduct experiments within SL to assess the155
overall feasibility of virtual experimentation. Our approach is to gauge to what156
extent the behaviour and values of virtual subjects conform to those of stan-157
dard subjects. In the following, we outline the general working procedure that158
we developed and deployed over the course of our experiments in terms of five159
stages of which individual experimental sessions consisted. All our experimen-160
tal sessions were conducted during standard GMT working hours between July161
and November 2007. Experimental instructions are available upon request.162
In the recruitment stage, we solicited participation by approaching online users163
in situ immediately prior to a particular experimental session in the following164
manner. Half an hour before a scheduled experimental session, we used a search165
feature in the SL-inteface to identify the currently busiest locations in terms of166
number of avatars present (excluding locations with an adult thematic focus).167
Next, each of the three experimenters used their avatar to access one of these168
locations and to address groups of avatars gathered there using public IM with169
a standardised recruitment message. This message was in English and stated170
our institutional affiliation and general information about the nature of the171
task, its duration and incentivisation. Whenever interested users responded,172
we answered any additional questions and informed volunteers of the time173
and venue of the session. This process was repeated for a number of locations174
and avatar groups in each until the recruitment of the desired number of175
participants was complete. The thirty minute period was in almost all cases176
sufficient to recruit between four and seven subjects.177
6
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Fig. 2. A typical experimental session in progress. The experimenters’ avatars are
standing.
Participants were transported to our virtual experimental laboratory in a ded-178
icated virtual building with controllable access rights and purpose-built labo-179
ratory furniture. In the briefing stage, subjects who have arrived (typically in180
groups between two and seven depending on the task) were given virtual doc-181
uments containing general information on experimental etiquette, anonymity,182
confidentiality and incentivisation. The two to three experimenters present at183
all times communicated with subjects using either public or private (i.e. one-184
to-one) IM. Once they have finished reading the briefing documents, subjects185
were asked to occupy cubicles that were purpose-built to restrict their vision186
and communication in order to prevent collusion between them. They were187
then given virtual documents containing the experimental instructions and188
a comprehension quiz. The decision task stage commenced after all subjects189
completed the quiz successfully. Experimenters instructed individually when190
subjects were initially unable to do so. Subjects communicated their decisions191
to the lead experimenter and received feedback via private IM. Next, in the192
survey stage, subjects were sent the URL of a webform containing a values193
survey as well as some demographic questions which they had to fill out. In the194
final, payment stage of the experimental session, subjects were paid earnings in195
$L on the spot using the SL payment transfer feature. A typical experimental196
session in progress is shown in figure 2.197
Table 1 provides some general information about the decision tasks of our ex-198
periments. Our choice of tasks was guided by our objective to assess whether a199
virtual subject pool may be appropriate in testing economic theories. In par-200
ticular, we wanted to examine whether virtual behaviour conforms to estab-201
lished results generated in conventional experimentation. As a result, we chose202
7
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the ultimatum (UG), dictator (DG), public good (PGG), guessing (GG) and203
minimum effort (MEG) games. Previous experimental results for all of these204
standard games abound for a variety of conditions as well as demographic and205
cultural groups and provide ready benchmarks for our own results. They also206
permit eliciting a broad spectrum of different types of strategic choice. In the207
following, we do not explain or analyse these standard games in detail, but208
report data from our and those previous studies most appropriate for compar-209
ison. We also report results from tests of differences in means, medians and210
overall distributions between them using t-tests, Mann-Whitney U (MW) and211
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z (KS) tests respectively. While means tests can indi-212
cate differences between the overall behavioural propensities in two pools of213
subjects, distribution tests can also reveal differences in the incidence of a va-214
riety of behaviours when average behaviour does not differ. For experimental215
tasks with multiple decision rounds, we also used regression analysis to test216
for differences with previous results. In particular, we pooled available data217
from our own and the previous study used as a comparator and estimated the218
following regression equation:219
Y ti = α + βY
t−1
i + γXi + δni (1)220
where Greek letters represent constant and parameters, Y is observed be-221
haviour, t the task round, n experimental group size and X a dummy variable222
for the comparator study. No differences between SL and comparator study223
behaviour exist to the extent that the coefficient for the latter variable is in-224
significant. The inclusion of the lagged variable on the right-hand side was225
intended to reduce omitted-variable bias in our model. In particular, it is well226
established that simple learning processes may explain some changes in be-227
haviour over time in specific game and choice contexts (see, e.g., Camerer228
1987, Erev and Roth 1998). As a result, we opted for a specification simi-229
lar to a partial adjustment model, where the behaviour in the current period230
is adjusted to that in the previous one. These kinds of dynamic model have231
been previously applied to the three games for which we seek to estimate be-232
haviour, i.e. the PGG (Healy, 2006), the GG (Kurz, 2008) as well as the MEG233
(Crawford, 1995).234
It should be noted that our design makes no provision for establishing a control235
treatment by replicating our virtual experiments in a standard physical set-236
ting with otherwise identical experimental parameters. While this alternative237
has certain advantages, our approach was to rely instead on the replicability238
of existing studies and to design virtual experiments that mirror their task239
conditions such as to permit using their results as a comparator.240
An additional avenue for testing subject pool suitability is to survey and com-241
pare our subjects’ values and demographics to those of standard experimental242
subjects and general populations. Values provide a measurement of a respon-243
8
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Task UG DG GG PGG MEG ESS
Subjects (N) 64 60 31 32 31 113
Subjects per session (n) 4-5 4-5 3-7 4 5-6 n/a
Average pay (U.S. $) 5.25 1.95 2.30 20.15 8.25 3.85
Duration (minutes approx.) 25 10 25 35 20 10
Rounds (r) or questions 1 1 10 10 10 21
Table 1
Summary statistics for experimental games and survey.
dent’s cultural orientation and are known to affect behaviour (Rokeach, 1973;244
Chuah et al., 2006). We used the human values survey designed by Shalom245
Schwartz for the European Social Survey (ESS) project (Schwartz, 2002). Like-246
wise, a number of demographics such as gender, age, and nationality are known247
to affect behaviour (see Camerer 2003 for an overview). In the following sec-248
tions, we report the results we obtained from the game tasks and survey.249
3 Experimental Results250
3.1 Subject Demographics251
Subjects’ basic demographical data are summarised in figure 3. The average252
age of respondents was 32, with the youngest at 18 and the oldest at 64. Com-253
pared with the general population of the European Union (EU), the age range254
20-40 years was over represented, an expected result given the technological255
and cultural status of virtual worlds. In line with SL generally, most subjects256
were from populous Western nations, although UK and European countries257
were somewhat over-represented in our sample. The reason may lie in using258
the English language and our institutional affiliation in recruitment. Recruit-259
ing during GMT daytime hours further bias sample selection in terms of time260
zone. In terms of gender, exactly half of our respondents were male.261
3.2 Ultimatum Game262
Separate sessions with UG-proposers and responders were conducted on 6,263
25 and 26 July 2007. In the proposer sessions, subjects were given the task to264
decide how to share L$3000 (U.S. $11.50) with a randomly-chosen co-player265
from a responder session who had the choice to accept or reject the split,266
9
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Fig. 3. Age and nationality distribution of SL-subjects.
resulting in the proposed shared being paid out or neither player receiving267
anything.268
Although there is little evidence for stake size effects in the UG (see Camerer269
2003), we aimed for comparability by using a stake in the U.S. $10-15 interval270
used in many previous studies, as well as for easy mental divisibility. Theory271
predicts that, because instrumentally-rational responders should accept any272
share of the stake, rational proposers should offer the minimum. However,273
proposers in previous studies offer in the region of 42-48% (see table 2.2.274
in Camerer 2003), reflecting a mixture of altruistic and strategic thinking on275
their part (Forsythe et al., 1994). In standard task conditions and subject pools276
recruited in industrialised nations, UG-results are relatively robust. Roth et al.277
(1991) (RPOZ) found little difference between offers made by urban subjects278
recruited in the U.S. (RPOZ 1), Tokyo (RPOZ 2), Yugoslavia and Israel.279
However, alternative cultural and demographic characteristics can generate280
differences (Camerer, 2003; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Buchan et al. (1997) and281
Chuah et al. (2007) (CHJW) identified slightly but significantly higher offers282
of South-East Asian subjects potentially linked to their collectivist values.283
Henrich et al. (2004) found a much wider range of offers (between 25-57%)284
in a series of experiments with traditional, small-scale societies across the285
developing world.286
Table 2 reports summary statistics of UG bargaining by SL-subjects compared287
with behaviour reported by RPOZ (1 and 2), by Hoffman et al. (1994) for288
U.S. subjects (HMSS) and by CHJW for UK subjects. The SL mean offer289
is 45.73% of the stake with a modal offer of half. These central tendencies290
in the proposals are very similar to those reported for comparable samples.291
Figure 4 shows the distributions of offers in all these experiments. With the292
exception of a small number of hyper-fair outliers among SL-subjects, the293
distribution we found is also very similar to those in the previous studies.294
Statistical tests bear these observations out. As the UK formed the largest295
10
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Fig. 4. Distribution of UG and DG offers in SL as well as in selected previous studies.
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SL HMSS RPOZ 1 RPOZ 2 CHJW
N/2 32 24 27 29 40
Stake 11.50 10 10 10 16
Offers
Mean 45.73 44 45 45 44
Mode 50 50 50 50 50
St. Dev. 18.6 7.2 9.6 21.0 9.5
Rejections
% of offers < 20% 33.33 - - 50 -
% of all offers 6.25 8.3 22 24 15
Table 2
Summary statistics of ultimatum game offers (in % of the U.S. $ stake) and rejections
for N/2 subject pairs in SL as well as in selected previous studies.
national group among our subjects (see section 3.7), we used UK subject data296
from CHJW as a comparator for our findings. No differences in the mean297
(t=0.216, p=0.829), median (U=2706.5, p=0.422) or distribution (Z=0.595,298
p=0.870) of offers were found between their and SL subjects.299
3.3 Dictator Game300
DGs were also conducted in separate sessions for proposers and responders,301
except that responders were not given the opportunity to accept or reject302
offers. The sessions were conduc ed on 27 and 31 July 2007. As a number of303
previous studies employed stakes divisible by 10, and since stake size effects304
are not noticeable between studies with significantly different stakes (see table305
3), we opted for a stake size of 1000 $L (U.S. $3.90). The DG was originally306
conceived as a way of separating altruistic and strategic motives in UG-offer307
behaviour (Forsythe et al., 1994). While instrumentally rational players should308
keep all of the stake, experimental subjects offer in the region of 20-35% to309
responders, reflecting altruistic preferences. DG-behaviour is sensitive to a host310
of experimental conditions such as anonymity, source and destination of the311
stake (see Camerer 2003 for an overview). In addition, subject demographics312
influence offers.313
Table 3 reports summary statistics of SL-dictator behaviour compared to sub-314
jects in comparable studies by Forsythe et al. (1994) (FHSS) and Carpenter315
et al. (2005) (CBV). Figure 4 displays the distributions of offers in the experi-316
ments reported there. The first two of these studies (centre panel of the figure)317
12
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FHSS 1 FHSS 2 CBV 1 CBV 3 SL CBV 2
N/2 24 45 21 26 30 37
Stake 10 5 100 100 3.90 100
Offers
Mean 24 24 25 33 43 45
Mode 30 0 50 50 50 50
Median 25 20 20 45 50 50
St. Dev. 17.68 20.44 19 20 16.17 12
Table 3
Summary statistics of dictator game offers (in % of the U.S. $ stake) for N/2 subject
pairs in SL as well as reported in selected previous studies.
report offers made by standard college student subjects which tend to be in318
the region of 23-24% of the stake (see also Hoffman et al. 1996, Cason and319
Mui 1998), although some studies, such as Schotter et al. (1996), have found320
offers close to 40%. Of particular interest to us is the study by CBV, who321
identified marked differences in DG offer levels based on age and experimental322
location (bottom panel of figure 4). In their study, they compare offers made323
by students (average age: 19 years) in standard college settings (CBV 1), by324
older community college students (27, CBV 2) and by workers in a warehouse325
setting (37, CBV 3).326
The data show the DG offers made by SL-subjects to be higher than those327
reported in standard college settings, but similar to those made by older sub-328
jects in CBV. These results reflect the greater average age of our subjects (see329
section 3.7) and the fact that DG-offers are sensitive to age (Harbaugh et al.,330
2003). Previous and current DG-results pertaining to older subjects are shown331
in the bottom panel in figure 4. It is also noteworthy that in our experiment,332
proposers communicated their offers to the experimenter directly using pri-333
vate IM rather than using forms collected and delivered in stacks by monitors334
as tends to be practiced in physical locations. Our treatment provides more335
scope for social influence and demand effects that would be expected to raise336
offers.337
The age similarity between warehouse workers in CBV 3 to our own SL-338
subjects provides us with an appropriate benchmark for the comparison of339
DG-behaviour. No statistically significant differences were found between the340
means (t=-0.700, p=0.485) medians (U=981.5, p=0.823) and distributions341
(Z=0.383, p=0.999) of DG offer data in these two pools.342
13
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3.4 Public Good Game343
The PGG sessions were conducted on 25 October and 2 November 2007. In344
them, subjects in groups of n = 4 were asked to divide a stake of L$400 (U.S.345
$1.50) between a private and a group fund and explained that their total earn-346
ings would be their private allocation plus a = 0.4 times the total of all group347
allocations. This was repeated r = 10 times. The parameter values for n, r348
and α were chosen with comparability with other studies in mind (see table 4).349
The PGG is a n-person version of the prisoner’s dilemma and pits subjects’350
self-serving motives against their desire to further the benefit of the group.351
Instrumentally-rational play involves complete free-riding and allocating the352
whole endowment to the private fund. In repeated PGGs, players decisions353
may be guided both by strategic considerations of reciprocation and purely354
altruistic motives. A large literature exists that identifies the experimental355
conditions that elicit cooperative behaviour. In general, subjects contribute356
positive amounts to the public good that steadily decline as the game is re-357
peated. The studies reporting PGG games under standard conditions serve as358
benchmarks for the behaviour of our SL-subjects. We compare the behaviour359
of SL-subjects with those in experiments with comparable conditions reported360
by Andreoni (1988, 1995) (A (88) and A (95)) as well as Fehr and Ga¨chter361
(2000) (FG), who used values for parameter a of 0.5, 0.5 and 0.4 respectively.362
Table 4 reports summary statistics of SL-PGG behaviour compared to sub-363
jects in these three.364
The top panel in figure 5 shows the average contribution to the group fund365
subjects made in SL and in the three previous studies over ten rounds. SL-366
subjects contribute marginally more than subjects in the other pools in all367
rounds. The average contribution decays over rounds in similar ways in all368
studies. The higher average we find is not unusual within the context of find-369
ings made using variegated subject pools. For instance, Henrich et al. (2004)370
report on PGGs played with traditional society subjects in many continents371
and find mean contribution rates to vary between 22 and 65%. The SL sub-372
jects differ from standard college students in a number of ways, age being one.373
Our result may also be due to the apparent greater altruism of SL-subjects374
compared with students we observed in the DG.375
For our statistical tests of PGG behaviour, we chose A (95)’s Western student376
subject data as a benchmark. It should be borne in mind that this experiment377
differs from our study in two ways; the differences in experimental platform378
we are assessing, and the differences in subject demographics. We performed379
mean, median and distribution tests between the offers for each of the ten380
rounds played by A (95) and SL subjects (see table 5). Only one of the resulting381
thirty test statistics was significant (Zn=10 = 1.370, p=0.047). As the repeated382
testing procedure amplifies the probability of Type I errors, we also estimated383
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Fig. 5. Average subject decisions in GG and PGG over r=10 rounds in SL and
selected previous studies.
equation 1 to compare the two data sets. The factor n could not be entered384
due its insufficient variation in the data set. The regression results are given385
in table 6 and show an insignificant coefficient for X, leading us to conclude386
that no behavioural differences are in evidence.387
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A (88) A (95) FG SL
N 30 40 24 32
n 5 5 4 4
r 10 10 10 10
Stake 0.50 0.60 0.86 1.50
α 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Contributions
Mean 33.20 44.09 37.94 50.34
Median 32.00 42.50 40.25 45.63
St. Dev. 21.65 27.47 16.89 22.54
Table 4
Summary statistics of public good game contributions (in % of the U.S. $ stake
averaged over r rounds) for N subjects playing in groups of n in SL as well as
reported in selected previous studies. Stakes are given as U.S.$-values of tokens
subjects were asked to allocate per round.
3.5 Minimum Effort Game388
The MEG sessions were conducted between 16 and 21 November 2007. In389
them, groups of n = 5 to 6 subjects were asked to choose an integer in the390
interval [1, 7] and informed that payoffs would be determined by the smallest391
number chosen within the group according to the payoff matrix adapted from392
Van Huyck et al. (1990) (VBB) and shown in table 7. Each group played ten393
rounds of this game. Again, these parameter values are standard to the extent394
that they have been adopted by the majority of previous studies. The game395
has multiple equilibria in which all players make the same choice, which payoff396
dominate each other in turn with a unique Pareto-efficient equilibrium in every397
player choosing 7. The game represents situations where a group’s ability to398
coordinate on the individually as well as collectively best outcome may be399
undermined by individuals’ pessimistic expectations of others’ reasoning. A400
typical example is punctuality (Camerer, 2003). While everyone arriving on401
time for a meeting is mutually the best outcome, an individual may arrive late402
to avoid a wait expecting others to also be late. After a number of meetings,403
such expectations may become increasingly self fulfilling as general punctuality404
disintegrates. Previous experimental evidence shows this kind of convergence405
on payoff-dominated outcomes to be dependent on the size of the group, the406
size of payoffs and information players receive about the choices of others.407
Figure 6 shows the round-to-round changes in the choices and minimum408
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Task r t MW U KS Z
PGG 1 0.431 (0.667) 619.0 (0.808) 1.054 (0.216)
2 0.499 (0.619) 611.5 (0.743) 0.949 (0.329)
3 0.864 (0.391) 572.0 (0.436) 0.764 (0.603)
4 1.231 (0.223) 536.5 (0.235) 1.001 (0.269)
5 0.697 (0.488) 567.0 (0.403) 0.817 (0.517)
6 1.231 (0.222) 534.5 (0.227) 0.870 (0.436)
7 0.673 (0.503) 573.5 (0.446) 0.738 (0.648)
8 0.568 (0.572) 544.5 (0.274) 1.370 (0.047**)
9 0.372 (0.711) 567.5 (0.405) 0.817 (0.517)
10 0.926 (0.358) 539.5 (0.240) 1.133 (0.153)
MEG 1 1.482 (0.141) 982.5 (0.139) 0.895 (0.452)
2 1.218 (0.226) 1023.0 (0.236) 0.833 (0.491)
3 1.927 (0.057) 931.0 (0.070*) 1.109 (0.171)
4 2.660 (0.009***) 822.5 (0.011**) 1.353 (0.051*)
5 1.449 (0.150) 986.0 (0.153) 0.713 (0.690)
6 1.382 (0.170) 990.0 (0.162) 0.983 (0.289)
7 1.571 (0.119) 955.5 (0.102) 0.888 (0.409)
8 0.785 (0.435) 1059.0 (0.351) 0.951 (0.326)
9 0.518 (0.606) 1073.5 (0.406) 1.042 (0.228)
10 2.364 (0.020**) 841.0 (0.014**) 1.347 (0.053*)
GG 1 1.798 (0.078*) 219.0 (0.079*) 0.928 (0.355)
2 0.091 (0.928) 305.0 (0.923) 0.478 (0.976)
3 2.195 (0.033**) 212.5 (0.060*) 1.226 (0.099*)
4 -1.090 (0.281) 268.5 (0.423) 0.821 (0.510)
5 1.003 (0.321) 289.5 (0.692) 0.664 (0.771)
6 0.032 (0.974) 280.5 (0.569) 0.703 (0.706)
7 0.538 (0.593) 283.0 (0.602) 0.664 (0.771)
8 -0.552 (0.583) 278.5 (0.543) 0.652 (0.788)
9 2.107 (0.041**) 250.5 (0.250) 1.277 (0.077*)
10 0.279 (0.781) 292.5 (0.735) 1.063 (0.209)
Table 5
Test statistics for differences in mean (t), median (U) and distribution (Z) of be-
haviour between SL subjects and those in selected previous studies for r=10 rounds.
Corresponding p-values are given in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
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PGG Estimate t-value p-value
Constant 14.24 6.39 0.000***
Yt−1 0.67 22.63 0.000***
X -2.47 -1.15 0.252
R2 (adj.)= 0.45 F= 260.69 p=0.000***
MEG Estimate t-value p-value
Constant 1.22 1.36 0.17
Yt−1 0.61 24.03 0.000***
n 0.06 0.43 0.664
X -0.34 -2.12 0.034**
R2 (adj.)=0.39 F=204.55 p=0.000***
GG Estimate t-value p-value
Constant 26.84 11.38 0.000***
Yt−1 0.25 8.09 0.000***
n -1.11 -2.82 0.005**
X -1.36 -0.81 0.416
R2 (adj.)=0.09 F=30.42 p=0.000***
Table 6
Regression results for experimental behaviour across three tasks in SL and one
comparator study respectively. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at
the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
choices averaged over experimental groups in SL and comparable previous409
studies of Knez and Camerer (1994) (KC), Bornstein et al. (2002) (BGN),410
Devetag (2005) (DT) and VBB. Table 8 reports summary statistics of SL-411
PGG behaviour compared to subjects in these studies. All these studies used412
VBB’s payoff matrix and had groups between 5-7 subjects except VBB, which413
had groups of 14-16. The figure shows similar declines in choices in all these414
studies. On the other hand, there appears to be greater variability in the over-415
all level of average choices, with SL-averages appearing higher than those in416
other studies.417
We used the data reported by DT for the comparison with SL-observations.418
In terms of means, medians and distributions for r=10 rounds, round four419
and ten behaviours were different in terms of all three at the 10%-level of420
significance (see table 5). With one exception (Un=3 = 931.0, p = 0.070), the421
other twenty-four tests were negative, suggesting no differences exist in the422
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Fig. 6. Average and average minimum MEG choices over r=10 rounds in SL and
selected previous studies.
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Smallest choice in group
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 390 330 270 210 150 90 30
6 - 360 300 240 180 120 60
5 - - 330 270 210 150 90
4 - - - 300 240 180 120
3 - - - - 270 210 150
2 - - - - - 240 180
1 - - - - - - 210
Table 7
MEG payoff matrix (in L$). The first column represents player choices which, com-
bined with the smallest choice in the group, determines payoffs. Dashes denote
logically impossible outcomes.
VBB KC BGN DT SL
N 107 30 42 77 31
n 14-16 6 7 7 5-6
r 10 5 10 14 10
Stake 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.82 1.46
Choices
Mean 2.72 2.87 3.65 3.75 4.44
Median 2.50 2.80 2.40 3.60 4.60
St. Dev. 1.30 1.07 1.34 1.57 1.51
Table 8
Summary statistics of minimum effort game choices over r rounds for N subjects
playing in groups of n in SL as well as reported in selected previous studies. Stakes
are given as U.S.$-value of payoff associated with unique Pareto-efficient outcome.
rounds concerned. Again, we regressed equation 1 for the combined data set423
(table 6). The results show that at the 95% significance level, our data are424
different to those of DT as the coefficient for X is significant (p = 0.034). It425
should be noted that the same model also yields differences between the data426
of DT and BGN (p = 0.084) as well as between SL and BGN (p = 0.002). As a427
result, for the MEG, these findings do not provide firm conclusions about the428
ability of virtual world experimentation to replicate laboratory results. The429
two comparator experiments differ from ours in an additional, demographical430
dimension and also differ from each other in terms of results. The reason may431
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lie in greater general variability in MEG-behaviour due to the presence of432
multiple equilibria.433
3.6 Guessing Game434
The GG sessions were conducted on 8 and 15 November 2007. In them, n=3435
to 7 subjects were asked to choose integers in the interval [0,100] and informed436
that the subject with a response closest to g = 0.7 times the average of all437
choices would receive L$200 (U.S. $0.75). Ties were resolved by dividing this438
sum among the winners. Each group of subjects played r = 10 rounds of this439
game.440
The GG (sometimes known as the beauty contest game) is used as a tool to441
identify what levels of reasoning subjects employ in strategic thinking (Nagel,442
1995; Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Camerer, 1997). A zero-order (i.e. unstrategic)443
player may choose randomly or use a focal point such as the median of the444
interval (50 in our case). First-order choosers may take others into consider-445
ation but assume these to be of order 0. An optimal first-order choice would446
be in the interval [0,70] accounting for the impossibility of the group average447
to exceed 70. In particular, a choice of 35 (0.7×50) may reflect a belief that448
zero-order guessers choose 50 on average. Second-order players who assume449
others to use order 1 will not choose above 49 (0.7×70), and may opt for 25450
(0.7×35) believing order 1 choices to average 35 and so forth. The iterative451
application of increasingly higher levels of reasoning will eventually yield an452
equilibrium choice of 0.453
The average and distribution of GG-choices therefore provides insights not454
only to what levels of reasoning subjects use, but also what levels they at-455
tribute to others. Equilibrium choices may reflect higher orders of reasoning456
but be ineffective when other players operate at lower levels. In addition, re-457
peated GGs show to what extent subjects learn to adjust their choices on the458
basis of previous rounds’ results. Table 9 shows statistics concerning subjects’459
choices in single or first rounds of repeated games played in groups of differ-460
ent sizes with a parameter g = 0.7. The Singaporean student data are from461
10-round GG-experiments reported in Ho et al. (1998) (HCW). The HCW 1462
pool consisted of 3-player groups playing the game for the first time. Subjects463
in HCW 2 also played in 3-player groups but had experience of one previous464
game with a different g-value. Finally, HCW 3 was composed of inexperienced465
7-subject group players. In all HCW-treatments, the winning subject received466
50 Singapore cents (ca. U.S.$ 0.34). The U.S. study of Kovalchik et al. (2005)467
(KCGPA) compares one-round choices by college students (KCGPA 1) with468
those of mentally healthy senior citizens with an average age of 82 (KCGPA469
2). Our experimental settings of group size, g-value and repetition are the470
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Subjects Mean Median St. Dev. % 0 N
Caltech students 21.88 23.00 10.35 0.07 27
Portfolio managers 24.31 24.35 16.15 0.08 26
Economics PhDs 27.44 30.00 18.69 0.13 16
U.S. high school students 32.45 28.00 18.61 0.04 52
College students (KCGPA 1) 35.00 35.00 12.86 0.00 51
Singaporean students (HCW 1) 36.45 35.00 24.28 0.00 21
German students 36.73 33.00 20.21 0.03 67
Senior citizens (KCGPA 2) 37.00 33.00 17.46 0.00 50
University CEOs 37.81 36.50 18.92 0.03 73
Wharton students 37.92 35.00 18.84 0.00 35
Singaporean students (HCW 3) 39.78 35.00 25.46 0.02 49
SL 50.00 56.00 27.10 0.00 31
Singaporean students (HCW 2) 58.27 50.00 26.98 0.05 21
Table 9
Summary statistics for round 1 GG choices in n-subject pools in SL as well as
reported by Camerer (2003), Camerer (1997) and Kovalchik et al. (2005). The per-
centage of subjects choosing 0 is given by %0.
same as in HCW 1, which is most useful for a direct comparison.471
SL first round choices are relatively high (especially compared to our bench-472
mark HCW 1) but by no means outside the range of previous results. The bot-473
tom panel in figure 5 shows mean choices over ten rounds among SL-subjects474
and Singaporean students (HCW). Table 9 reports summary statistics of SL-475
GG behaviour compared to subjects in this study. Our subjects did appear to476
converge towards the equilibrium at similar rates to the latter. The frequency477
distribution of individual SL-choices over all ten rounds is displayed in figure 7,478
along with the corresponding data for HCW 1 reported in Ho et al. (1998)(p.479
955, figure 2E). Both distributions are similar in that a greater proportion480
of choices are low in later rounds. The SL-data appear different mainly in481
the more equal distribution in early rounds. However, towards the end of the482
game, the distributions are more similar, reflected in the convergence of curves483
in figure 5.484
GG data generally show divergence in first-round average choices. Part of the485
reason may be the role that players’ common knowledge of rationality has in486
equilibrium reasoning. Lower choices are not merely associated with greater487
strategic sophistication among players, but also with greater expectations con-488
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Fig. 7. Subject choice frequency distributions over r=10 rounds (group size 3, p=0.7)
in HCW 1 and SL.
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cerning the sophistication of others. Groups that are more sophisticated as well489
as more uniformly so, such as Caltech students, may therefore be expected to490
exhibit lower choices than comparatively heterogeneous groups such as SL491
where little is known about others who take part. Our first-round results may492
have not been much different had our pool consisted of anonymous and mutu-493
ally unaware game theorists disguised by avatars. The fact that SL-subjects’494
learning resulted in similar final-round choices supports this possibility. The495
anonymity of SL, potentially subverting the common knowledge of rationality,496
may therefore partly explain any differences in round one choices in SL.497
We compared the means, medians and distributions of SL choices with HCW498
1 over r=10 rounds (see table 5). Rounds 1, 3 and 9 show differences in499
all three dimensions. In total, seven of the thirty tests were positive, most500
only at the 10%-significance level. Table 6 shows the regression results for501
equation 1 pooling SL data with HCW 1 and 3. The latter study was not used502
for the tests as its larger subject group size rendered it inappropriate for a503
direct comparison; however, we were able to control for that difference using504
variable n in the regression. The results show an insignificant coefficient for505
X (p = 0.416). We conclude differences are not in evidence between the data506
sets.507
3.7 Universal Human Values508
In order to assess whether an idiosyncratic cultural environment exists within509
SL, we administered the ESS human values survey. This survey is based on510
Schwartz’s portrait values questionnaire, a well-tested instrument for identi-511
fying ten universal value dimensions (listed in figure 8). An individual’s scores512
are calculated on the basis of responses on a 6-point Likert scale indicating513
own similarity with 21 hypothetical value portraits. Subjects completed the514
survey on a webform immediately after the decision task stage of the session.515
Upon completion, each subject was paid L$1000 (ca. U.S. $3.85) for the survey516
in addition to the pay-outs from the decision task.517
Again, a host of existing data for this survey generates scope for compar-518
ing SL-subjects with standard populations. Cultural and demographic factors519
may have an influence on economic behaviour as they shape an individual’s520
social interaction and socialisation into particular values. Values are therefore521
an important indicator of how representative particular subject pools are of522
the underlying population to which economic theory relates. We conducted523
the human values survey in order to ascertain to what extent SL-residents re-524
semble standard experimental subjects culturally. Figure 8 shows the average525
value orientations of our subjects compared with those of respondents of the526
2002-2003 ESS, as well as a standard sample of thirty-six UK university stu-527
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Fig. 8. Average orientations of ESS-respondents (ESS), SL and UK student subjects
(UKU) according to Schwartz’ ten value dimensions.
dents (UKU) we also administered the questionnaire to. The ESS randomly528
samples more than 1500 adults from each participating nation’s resident popu-529
lation. The students were UK nationals invited randomly by automated email530
from the experimental subject database maintained by the Centre for Decision531
Research and Experimental Economics. For comparative purposes, we follow532
the ESS practice of presenting averages of ipsative scores, i.e. an individual’s533
Likert-scale responses standardised in terms of his or her overall response av-534
erage and variance. Ipsatised scores for different value dimensions have the535
advantage of being comparable in terms of relative strength.536
Schwartz’ ten human values are shown along the horizontal axis of figure 8.537
They have established empirical interrelationships that are commonly used538
to reduce them to two basic dimensions shown along the two respective axes539
in figure 9. The first dimension, self-transcendence v. self-enhancement, en-540
compasses six values: hedonism, stimulation and self direction relative to tra-541
dition, conformity and security. The former three values express underlying542
motivations such as pleasure, sensuous gratification, excitement, novelty and543
independence, while the latter express respect and acceptance of norms, self-544
restraint and harmony. The remaining four universal values are contained in545
the the second dimension, openness to change v. conservatism. It weighs the546
values of universalism and benevolence against those of power and achieve-547
ment. The former two values express motivations including tolerance and care548
for the welfare of others, while the latter two encompass social status, personal549
success and dominance over others. Figure 9 plots nations and subject pools550
according to the two overall dimensions.551
Our survey data indicate that while SL-users’ value orientations differ from552
those of ESS-respondents, they do so to a lesser extent than those of the UK553
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Fig. 9. Average orientations of ESS-respondents by nationality, SL and UK student
subjects (UKU) according to Schwartz’ two composite value dimensions.
student subjects. The SL and student average value orientations correlate at554
90% with each other, and respectively at about 70 and 64% with the averaged555
overall ESS-orientation of EU respondents. By comparison, individual national556
samples within ESS correlate with the average EU-values profile at about557
94%. The graph shows a relatively small distance between randomly-sampled558
individuals from European nations to SL-users and UK students. The students559
place a greater importance on the factors underlying self-enhancement, as can560
be verified in figure 8. This is consistent with age effects found in previous value561
surveys comparing students and teachers (Schwartz, 2001). Another reason for562
the difference may lie in a slightly higher relative socio-economic background563
and educational potential of students. However, caution has to be exercised564
due to our small sample size.565
4 Methodological Discussion566
Our experience of conducting experiments in SL suggests a number of ad-567
vantages and disadvantages of virtual experimentation generally as well as568
practical steps to adapt the platform for experimental purposes.569
It was possible, with little organisation and preparation, to recruit subjects570
in situ in the numbers we could manage within the SL-interface. SL’s fea-571
tures make it simple to create and maintain a database of subjects for future572
use. On the other hand, this procedure is prone to biased sample selection573
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on the basis of choosing busy recruitment locations, of solicitation, in the574
recruitment language, time and institutional affiliation we used. In addition,575
the relative anonymity that avatars confer on subjects makes it difficult in576
practice to prevent financially-motivated repeat participation or the recruit-577
ment of unfit (tired or intoxicated) or non-eligible or non-targeted subjects.578
While these issues may not be completely resolvable, we attempted to miti-579
gate both repeat and unsuitable participation by disqualifying avatars using580
the following criteria. First, to avoid repeats, we excluded avatars who partici-581
pated previously, who were created after the first experimental session or who582
made unsolicited approaches to us. To avoid unsuitable participants, we also583
excluded avatars less than a month old and potentially insufficiently familiar584
with the SL-environment, avatars referred by previous subjects who may have585
prior knowledge of the task, and avatars representing users who appeared to586
be in an unfit state. An additional identity issue both in our and in other587
virtual world studies concerns the potential for a disparity between user and588
avatar characteristics. For many users, the attraction of SL consists of the589
potential for using an avatar to assume a new and different identity. While590
our study was designed to elicit the behaviour and values of users and not591
avatars, we cannot be certain to what extent this was practised by subjects592
responding through their avatars.593
Our demographical and values survey shows that virtual worlds provide oppor-594
tunities for recruiting subjects who are demographically more representative595
than university students. In addition, targeting particular types of individuals596
is possible within those groups represented in virtual worlds, such as partic-597
ular nations. Clearly, some groups are currently not sufficiently represented598
in virtual worlds, including individuals from smaller and traditional societies.599
However, the bias of SL towards industrialised nations is likely to change as600
economic development provides greater access to the Internet to more people601
worldwide.602
The relatively sophisticated SL-economy provides some scope for appropriate603
incentive mechanisms. In particular, SL has developed informal labour and604
product markets which generate incentivisable subjects as well as money or605
in-kind rewards that can be delivered easily. Many users regularly participate606
in paid online activities for returns which are modest compared with those of607
standard economic experiments. In addition, the developed markets for virtual608
objects provide alternative in-kind incentives.609
While the computerised interface of SL provides an economical experimental610
environment that is well suited for data generation, collection and storage, it611
also has certain disadvantages. Communicating with subjects using IM makes612
it difficult to deal with more than a handful per session. In addition, private IM613
makes it hard to detect collusive behaviour or conferring amongst subjects.614
While is it not possible to override the communication mechanisms of SL,615
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we developed virtual laboratory furniture that alerts the experimenter to the616
potential for clandestine communication between subjects (visible in figure617
2). In particular, upon entering the virtual laboratory, subjects were asked618
to sit in cubicles and to enter mouselook, a SL-mode under which avatars619
are restricted to frontal vision and where private IM is suspended, in line620
with standard experimental conditions. Once activated, the furniture indicates621
whenever a subject suspends the mouselook mode and is therefore able to use622
private IM. While this furniture assured discipline in practice, it is in theory623
possible for experts to circumvent such mechanisms. On the other hand, this624
requires not only significant expertise on the part of a subject, but matching625
skills of and prior collusion with another subject present in order to establish a626
clandestine communication channel. Another problematic issue is establishing627
subject trust in the experimenters. Because of the nature of virtual worlds,628
it is difficult to convince subjects of the genuine nature of the experiment629
and incentivisation. A further problem involves the potential for disruption630
of experimental sessions by other users. This, however, may be controlled by631
restricting access to the virtual laboratory.632
The absence of physical signals and presence in virtual worlds creates clear633
differences between virtual and physical experimental conditions. Virtual ex-634
periments preclude physical presence that may influence behaviour through635
involuntary non-verbal communication that reveals emotional states. In ad-636
dition, the potential for anonymity means that the social consequences of637
virtual behaviour are different to those in physical laboratories. These factors638
may limit the comparability of virtual and physical experimental results in639
many cases. Virtual experimentation is clearly not appropriate when physical640
phenomena are part of the experimental treatment, such as when the effect of641
face-to-face interactions is tested.642
5 Conclusion643
Despite the non-standard nature of the SL-subject pool and certain imper-644
fections of the experimental environment that it provides, we were unable to645
detect significant and systematic overall differences between their behaviours646
and those observed in traditional settings. In particular, given SL-users’ demo-647
graphics in terms of age and cultural background, behaviour closely matched648
expectations based on a host of existing experimental evidence for a range649
of five important games. These results suggest tentatively that virtual world650
economic phenomena are based on similar behavioural regularities observed651
in standard economic settings and can be tested experimentally within the652
virtual environment.653
In addition, there is a slightly lesser cultural and age bias within SL than654
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at the average university campus. Users’ values are more in line with those655
of general populations of economic agents. There was little evidence of users’656
niche interests or motivations generating an unsuitable subject pool. Our work657
therefore supports Yee (2006), whose study of virtual world demographics658
dispels the popular notion that they are predominantly the domain of a male,659
adolescent sub-culture with niche interests. His data indicate that usage and660
appeal are equally strong over gender and age groups as well as based more661
on general social motivations (such as relationship building) than escapism.662
It should be noted that our study was not designed to provide support for663
or against virtual world experimentation as a method in absolute terms. In-664
stead, we adopted a less ambitious research question regarding its ability to665
reproduce the results of traditional experimentation in physical laboratories666
with standard subjects. As a result, the absence of observed behavioural dif-667
ferences between the two environments does not necessarily make a case for668
virtual experiments per se, but rather suggests they may be a valid alterna-669
tive to traditional method, subject to similar methodological advantages and670
limitations. Conversely, the presence of such differences would not necessarily671
invalidate virtual experimentation to the extent that the standard physical672
laboratory method is not without imperfections. As a result, these method-673
ological issues remain and may benefit from renewed debate in the context of674
virtual experimentation.675
While the above suggests that virtual world experimentation has potential as676
an economical and practical alternative to standard laboratory experiments,677
there are certain disadvantages associated with virtual worlds as experimental678
platforms which suggest that their suitability depends on the type of experi-679
ment planned. For instance, studies that consider the effects of physical sig-680
nals or depend on recruiting specific types of subjects will find little value in681
virtual experimentation. On the other hand, suitably adapting experimental682
procedures to the virtual world environment makes it possible to effectively683
and cheaply recreate many standard decision tasks. In addition, virtual world684
users appear to constitute suitable subject pools to the extent that they dis-685
play many of the economic behaviours associated with standard subjects. The686
future development of this technology will further increase the sophistication687
of the virtual experimental platform.688
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Virtual world experimentation: An
exploratory study
Abstract
We explore the scientific potential of virtual worlds for experimental economics
in terms of the subject pools and experimental platforms they present. Our results
offer tentative, qualified support for virtual world experimentation. Overall, the be-
haviour of virtual subjects recruited, incentivised and observed within Second Life
across a range of five standard experimental games was not found to differ signifi-
cantly from established standard results. In addition, we identify certain method-
ological opportunities and challenges which confront virtual world experimenters.
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1 Introduction1
Social scientists are becoming increasingly interested in virtual worlds, three-2
dimensional environments in which communities of networked individuals in-3
teract (Castranova, 2005; Bainbridge, 2007; Bloomfield, 2007). There are two4
reasons. First, the growing number of users and the scope and nature of socio-5
economic activity between them are seen as interesting phenomena that merit6
investigation in their own right (Castranova, 2005). Virtual worlds present7
evolving cultures with independent social institutions that are becoming more8
significant to society at large (Noveck, 2004). In economic terms, their evo-9
lution from specialised video game networks to general social platforms has10
generated a global industry of firms that leverage installed user bases for sub-11
scription fees, advertising opportunities or virtual support services (Cagnina12
and Poian, 2007). Many virtual worlds have evolving economies with fully con-13
vertible currencies as well as functioning financial, labour and product markets14
that are capable of producing a host of micro and macroeconomic phenomena15
(Guest, 2007).16
Second, the computer technology underlying virtual worlds provides novel17
methods of conducting social science research (Bainbridge, 2007). To begin18
with, it facilitates the economical and large-scale recruitment of diverse sub-19
jects from different cultural-geographical and socio-economic groups for par-20
ticipation in interviews, focus groups, surveys or experiments. In addition,21
it affords control of the environment in which they decide and interact that22
can be used to manipulate decision conditions, observe behaviour and collect23
data. Conversely, however, both these features also present potential method-24
ological problems. As subjects, virtual world users may not reflect standard25
populations in terms of demographic or cultural characteristics and there-26
fore may display different behaviours. The electronic interface that moderates27
communication and interaction between them precludes physiological signals28
and proximity that moderate economic behaviour in physical settings. Vir-29
tual world culture, social institutions and conventions that evolve as a result30
may shape economic interactions in ways that differ from traditional social31
settings. The anonymity of the interface may hamper quality control in the32
data collection process.33
The current study is intended as a first, exploratory step towards the method-34
ological issue. While virtual worlds may provide useful research tools for a35
number of social science disciplines, we concentrate here on their potential as36
platforms for designing and conducting economic experiments, an area which37
may be especially conducive to benefit from the new methods virtual worlds of-38
fer (Bainbridge, 2007; Castranova, 2006). Traditional experimental economics39
involves testing economic theories by observing the incentivised decisions of40
representative subjects under choice conditions systematically manipulated in41
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laboratory settings. Virtual worlds may provide opportunities for methodolog-42
ical innovation here. The discipline has recently begun to broaden its scope43
by exploring new methods and applications outside the standard controlled44
laboratory environment commonly populated by Western student subjects.45
There are two related ways in which experimentalists are trying to improve46
the realism of the behaviour they observe. First, field studies in naturalistic47
settings are being proposed as a way of avoiding the distorting effects artificial48
laboratory settings may have on subject behaviour (Harrison and List, 2004).49
Second, new recruitment techniques and sampling locations are being used50
to overcome the reliance of experimentalists on Western university students51
to generate results (Anderhub et al., 2001; Henrich et al., 2004, e.g.). Virtual52
worlds may give an opportune impetus to both of these concerns. First, due53
to their computerised interfaces, they may provide relatively controlled en-54
vironments for conducting experiments while remaining within a naturalistic55
setting familiar to subjects. Second, virtual worlds may be inhabited by a56
wider cross section of people such that sampling from different cultures and57
more heterogeneous backgrounds may be possible in a single location acces-58
sible to experimentalists. In this sense, virtual worlds may bridge the gap59
between laboratory experiments and field studies, allowing researchers to use60
representative subjects in more natural environments to study the relationship61
between the conditions of interaction and the evolution of social institutions62
in a controlled manner.63
We assess to what extent virtual worlds can be used in this context. We ap-64
proach the issue in two ways, by replication and by observation. First, virtual65
world experimentation can be a useful, alternative experimental tool to the66
extent that the results it generates for particular tasks and conditions are the67
same as those generated by traditional experimental methods. We assess this68
aspect by conducting virtual experiments with a range of standard tasks in69
standard conditions and comparing virtual subject behaviour with that of tra-70
ditional pools reported in existing work. The suitability of virtual experimenta-71
tion as an alternative would be supported to the extent that no differences are72
found. As the observed subject behaviour may be related to their underlying73
culture, demographics and values, we also used a survey instrument to collect74
data on these which can be compared to standard populations. The difference75
or similarity of virtual users to these provides additional insight into their76
suitability as experimental subjects representative of economic agents gener-77
ally. This first part of our approach tests the scope virtual worlds hold for78
traditional economic experimentation, rather than for new avenues of experi-79
mental research they may promise. We conceive of it as measuring the ‘output’80
of the virtual experimentation method. The second part of our approach is81
more qualitative and focuses on its ‘input’ side. This involves gathering in-82
formal insights about the practical feasibility of economic experimentation in83
virtual environments from the process of conducting experiments. We hoped84
to learn by observation to what extent virtual worlds can provide a suitable85
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platform for experimental research generally, what the advantages and disad-86
vantages are, and what modifications may be made to render virtual worlds87
more amenable to experimentation. This second part may also provide in-88
sights into what opportunities for new research approaches or methods virtual89
worlds hold.90
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss91
the features of virtual worlds, their significance for experimentalists and our92
procedure of methodologically assessing them. The results we obtained are93
reported in section 3. Section 4 discusses our general observations from the94
experiment in terms of the methodological issues we consider. The final section95
contains concluding remarks.96
2 Virtual Experimentation97
2.1 Virtual Worlds98
While there is considerable variation between the many alternative virtual99
worlds that exist, they typically reproduce features of the physical world such100
as a three-dimensional topography containing virtual objects obeying simu-101
lated physical laws as well as the possibility of communication, social interac-102
tion and economic exchange between users virtually represented by avatars.103
We chose Second Life (SL, see Linden-Labs 2008) as the virtual platform for104
our study. At the time of writing (November 2008), SL has over 15.7 million105
registered avatars. 1 Accounting for multiple and dormant registrations, there106
are an estimated one million regular users who spend over twenty million hours107
logged in per month. Between twenty and thirty thousand users are online at108
any one time. In terms of demographics, the majority of these are from popu-109
lous and industrialised countries including the USA, the UK, Germany, Brazil,110
France and Japan, with a median age of 36 and 57% being male.111
SL is divided into individual sectors with topographical features in which112
avatars can operate, including oceans, rivers, mountains and beaches as well113
as flora. A typical location is displayed in figure 1. Avatars are capable of loco-114
motion, including walking, running and flying and are immune to destruction.115
They communicate using instant text messaging (IM) and can signal voice116
intonation such as whispering and shouting as well as use gestures and body117
language. Public IM can be received by all avatars in the vicinity, while private118
IM is transmitted only between two avatars irrespective of location. Internet119
1 Economic and general statistics concerning SL are available at:
http://secondlife.com/whatis/economy.php and http://blog.secondlife.com/.
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Fig. 1. Typical SL-screenshot showing the user’s avatar (male foreground figure),
the surrounding SL-environment and interface controls along the bottom.
telephony has recently been introduced to SL. Users can edit the appearance120
of avatars in terms of physical features, clothing and assessories. As a result,121
avatars can assume the form of humans, animals, fantasy creatures or objects.122
Avatars are associated with user accounts that include money balances in Lin-123
den dollars (L$) which can be bought from or sold to Linden Lab, the creators124
and owners of SL, at a relatively stable exchange rate of about 270 L$ per125
1 U.S. dollar. A total of 5.3 billion L$ (U.S. $19.7 million) are currently in126
circulation. SL provides an interface feature that allows immediate and direct127
account-to-account transfers. These balances can be used to purchase a port-128
folio of tradable virtual objects including land, buildings, vehicles, clothing,129
accessories and tools.130
2.2 Experimental Economics131
Virtual worlds such as SL may have potential as powerful new platforms for132
designing and conducting experimental research. Bainbridge (2007) makes the133
following case:134
Virtual worlds such as SL provide environments and tools that facilitate135
creating online laboratories that can automatically recruit potentially thou-136
sands of research subjects, over a period of months, at low cost. SL offers137
scripting and graphics tools that allow anyone to build a virtual laboratory138
building, functioning equipment to run the experiment, and incentives to139
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motivate participation. (p. 473)140
Conversely, however, the very technology that generates these advantages may141
give rise to a number of a priori concerns about virtual experimentation. Prin-142
cipally, experimenters know little about the identity or state of the subjects143
who control the participating avatars. This may make it difficult to recruit144
appropriate subjects, to ensure discipline in the virtual laboratory, to prevent145
repeat participation and subject collusion and to engender subjects’ trust and146
confidence in the experiment. There is a possibility of demographic or cul-147
tural idiosyncrasies of virtual subjects generally. This may generate a sample148
bias that renders virtual experimentation inappropriate to test general eco-149
nomic theories. They may have more hedonistic or short-term tendencies or150
show less conformity than the average person. In addition, virtual behaviour151
is not moderated by physical presence and may therefore not be comparable152
to traditionally-generated results.153
2.3 Experimental Design154
The purpose of our study is to conduct experiments within SL to assess the155
overall feasibility of virtual experimentation. Our approach is to gauge to what156
extent the behaviour and values of virtual subjects conform to those of stan-157
dard subjects. In the following, we outline the general working procedure that158
we developed and deployed over the course of our experiments in terms of five159
stages of which individual experimental sessions consisted. All our experimen-160
tal sessions were conducted during standard GMT working hours between July161
and November 2007. Experimental instructions are available upon request.162
In the recruitment stage, we solicited participation by approaching online users163
in situ immediately prior to a particular experimental session in the following164
manner. Half an hour before a scheduled experimental session, we used a search165
feature in the SL-inteface to identify the currently busiest locations in terms of166
number of avatars present (excluding locations with an adult thematic focus).167
Next, each of the three experimenters used their avatar to access one of these168
locations and to address groups of avatars gathered there using public IM with169
a standardised recruitment message. This message was in English and stated170
our institutional affiliation and general information about the nature of the171
task, its duration and incentivisation. Whenever interested users responded,172
we answered any additional questions and informed volunteers of the time173
and venue of the session. This process was repeated for a number of locations174
and avatar groups in each until the recruitment of the desired number of175
participants was complete. The thirty minute period was in almost all cases176
sufficient to recruit between four and seven subjects.177
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Fig. 2. A typical experimental session in progress. The experimenters’ avatars are
standing.
Participants were transported to our virtual experimental laboratory in a ded-178
icated virtual building with controllable access rights and purpose-built labo-179
ratory furniture. In the briefing stage, subjects who have arrived (typically in180
groups between two and seven depending on the task) were given virtual doc-181
uments containing general information on experimental etiquette, anonymity,182
confidentiality and incentivisation. The two to three experimenters present at183
all times communicated with subjects using either public or private (i.e. one-184
to-one) IM. Once they have finished reading the briefing documents, subjects185
were asked to occupy cubicles that were purpose-built to restrict their vision186
and communication in order to prevent collusion between them. They were187
then given virtual documents containing the experimental instructions and188
a comprehension quiz. The decision task stage commenced after all subjects189
completed the quiz successfully. Experimenters instructed individually when190
subjects were initially unable to do so. Subjects communicated their decisions191
to the lead experimenter and received feedback via private IM. Next, in the192
survey stage, subjects were sent the URL of a webform containing a values193
survey as well as some demographic questions which they had to fill out. In the194
final, payment stage of the experimental session, subjects were paid earnings in195
$L on the spot using the SL payment transfer feature. A typical experimental196
session in progress is shown in figure 2.197
Table 1 provides some general information about the decision tasks of our ex-198
periments. Our choice of tasks was guided by our objective to assess whether a199
virtual subject pool may be appropriate in testing economic theories. In par-200
ticular, we wanted to examine whether virtual behaviour conforms to estab-201
lished results generated in conventional experimentation. As a result, we chose202
7
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the ultimatum (UG), dictator (DG), public good (PGG), guessing (GG) and203
minimum effort (MEG) games. Previous experimental results for all of these204
standard games abound for a variety of conditions as well as demographic and205
cultural groups and provide ready benchmarks for our own results. They also206
permit eliciting a broad spectrum of different types of strategic choice. In the207
following, we do not explain or analyse these standard games in detail, but208
report data from our and those previous studies most appropriate for compar-209
ison. We also report results from tests of differences in means, medians and210
overall distributions between them using t-tests, Mann-Whitney U (MW) and211
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Z (KS) tests respectively. While means tests can indi-212
cate differences between the overall behavioural propensities in two pools of213
subjects, distribution tests can also reveal differences in the incidence of a va-214
riety of behaviours when average behaviour does not differ. For experimental215
tasks with multiple decision rounds, we also used regression analysis to test216
for differences with previous results. In particular, we pooled available data217
from our own and the previous study used as a comparator and estimated the218
following regression equation:219
Y ti = α + βY
t−1
i + γXi + δni (1)220
where Greek letters represent constant and parameters, Y is observed be-221
haviour, t the task round, n experimental group size and X a dummy variable222
for the comparator study. No differences between SL and comparator study223
behaviour exist to the extent that the coefficient for the latter variable is in-224
significant. The inclusion of the lagged variable on the right-hand side was225
intended to reduce omitted-variable bias in our model. In particular, it is well226
established that simple learning processes may explain some changes in be-227
haviour over time in specific game and choice contexts (see, e.g., Camerer228
1987, Erev and Roth 1998). As a result, we opted for a specification simi-229
lar to a partial adjustment model, where the behaviour in the current period230
is adjusted to that in the previous one. These kinds of dynamic model have231
been previously applied to the three games for which we seek to estimate be-232
haviour, i.e. the PGG (Healy, 2006), the GG (Kurz, 2008) as well as the MEG233
(Crawford, 1995).234
It should be noted that our design makes no provision for establishing a control235
treatment by replicating our virtual experiments in a standard physical set-236
ting with otherwise identical experimental parameters. While this alternative237
has certain advantages, our approach was to rely instead on the replicability238
of existing studies and to design virtual experiments that mirror their task239
conditions such as to permit using their results as a comparator.240
An additional avenue for testing subject pool suitability is to survey and com-241
pare our subjects’ values and demographics to those of standard experimental242
subjects and general populations. Values provide a measurement of a respon-243
8
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Task UG DG GG PGG MEG ESS
Subjects (N) 64 60 31 32 31 113
Subjects per session (n) 4-5 4-5 3-7 4 5-6 n/a
Average pay (U.S. $) 5.25 1.95 2.30 20.15 8.25 3.85
Duration (minutes approx.) 25 10 25 35 20 10
Rounds (r) or questions 1 1 10 10 10 21
Table 1
Summary statistics for experimental games and survey.
dent’s cultural orientation and are known to affect behaviour (Rokeach, 1973;244
Chuah et al., 2006). We used the human values survey designed by Shalom245
Schwartz for the European Social Survey (ESS) project (Schwartz, 2002). Like-246
wise, a number of demographics such as gender, age, and nationality are known247
to affect behaviour (see Camerer 2003 for an overview). In the following sec-248
tions, we report the results we obtained from the game tasks and survey.249
3 Experimental Results250
3.1 Subject Demographics251
Subjects’ basic demographical data are summarised in figure 3. The average252
age of respondents was 32, with the youngest at 18 and the oldest at 64. Com-253
pared with the general population of the European Union (EU), the age range254
20-40 years was over represented, an expected result given the technological255
and cultural status of virtual worlds. In line with SL generally, most subjects256
were from populous Western nations, although UK and European countries257
were somewhat over-represented in our sample. The reason may lie in using258
the English language and our institutional affiliation in recruitment. Recruit-259
ing during GMT daytime hours further bias sample selection in terms of time260
zone. In terms of gender, exactly half of our respondents were male.261
3.2 Ultimatum Game262
Separate sessions with UG-proposers and responders were conducted on 6,263
25 and 26 July 2007. In the proposer sessions, subjects were given the task to264
decide how to share L$3000 (U.S. $11.50) with a randomly-chosen co-player265
from a responder session who had the choice to accept or reject the split,266
9
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Fig. 3. Age and nationality distribution of SL-subjects.
resulting in the proposed shared being paid out or neither player receiving267
anything.268
Although there is little evidence for stake size effects in the UG (see Camerer269
2003), we aimed for comparability by using a stake in the U.S. $10-15 interval270
used in many previous studies, as well as for easy mental divisibility. Theory271
predicts that, because instrumentally-rational responders should accept any272
share of the stake, rational proposers should offer the minimum. However,273
proposers in previous studies offer in the region of 42-48% (see table 2.2.274
in Camerer 2003), reflecting a mixture of altruistic and strategic thinking on275
their part (Forsythe et al., 1994). In standard task conditions and subject pools276
recruited in industrialised nations, UG-results are relatively robust. Roth et al.277
(1991) (RPOZ) found little difference between offers made by urban subjects278
recruited in the U.S. (RPOZ 1), Tokyo (RPOZ 2), Yugoslavia and Israel.279
However, alternative cultural and demographic characteristics can generate280
differences (Camerer, 2003; Oosterbeek et al., 2004). Buchan et al. (1997) and281
Chuah et al. (2007) (CHJW) identified slightly but significantly higher offers282
of South-East Asian subjects potentially linked to their collectivist values.283
Henrich et al. (2004) found a much wider range of offers (between 25-57%)284
in a series of experiments with traditional, small-scale societies across the285
developing world.286
Table 2 reports summary statistics of UG bargaining by SL-subjects compared287
with behaviour reported by RPOZ (1 and 2), by Hoffman et al. (1994) for288
U.S. subjects (HMSS) and by CHJW for UK subjects. The SL mean offer289
is 45.73% of the stake with a modal offer of half. These central tendencies290
in the proposals are very similar to those reported for comparable samples.291
Figure 4 shows the distributions of offers in all these experiments. With the292
exception of a small number of hyper-fair outliers among SL-subjects, the293
distribution we found is also very similar to those in the previous studies.294
Statistical tests bear these observations out. As the UK formed the largest295
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Fig. 4. Distribution of UG and DG offers in SL as well as in selected previous studies.
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SL HMSS RPOZ 1 RPOZ 2 CHJW
N/2 32 24 27 29 40
Stake 11.50 10 10 10 16
Offers
Mean 45.73 44 45 45 44
Mode 50 50 50 50 50
St. Dev. 18.6 7.2 9.6 21.0 9.5
Rejections
% of offers < 20% 33.33 - - 50 -
% of all offers 6.25 8.3 22 24 15
Table 2
Summary statistics of ultimatum game offers (in % of the U.S. $ stake) and rejections
for N/2 subject pairs in SL as well as in selected previous studies.
national group among our subjects (see section 3.7), we used UK subject data296
from CHJW as a comparator for our findings. No differences in the mean297
(t=0.216, p=0.829), median (U=2706.5, p=0.422) or distribution (Z=0.595,298
p=0.870) of offers were found between their and SL subjects.299
3.3 Dictator Game300
DGs were also conducted in separate sessions for proposers and responders,301
except that responders were not given the opportunity to accept or reject302
offers. The sessions were conduc ed on 27 and 31 July 2007. As a number of303
previous studies employed stakes divisible by 10, and since stake size effects304
are not noticeable between studies with significantly different stakes (see table305
3), we opted for a stake size of 1000 $L (U.S. $3.90). The DG was originally306
conceived as a way of separating altruistic and strategic motives in UG-offer307
behaviour (Forsythe et al., 1994). While instrumentally rational players should308
keep all of the stake, experimental subjects offer in the region of 20-35% to309
responders, reflecting altruistic preferences. DG-behaviour is sensitive to a host310
of experimental conditions such as anonymity, source and destination of the311
stake (see Camerer 2003 for an overview). In addition, subject demographics312
influence offers.313
Table 3 reports summary statistics of SL-dictator behaviour compared to sub-314
jects in comparable studies by Forsythe et al. (1994) (FHSS) and Carpenter315
et al. (2005) (CBV). Figure 4 displays the distributions of offers in the experi-316
ments reported there. The first two of these studies (centre panel of the figure)317
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FHSS 1 FHSS 2 CBV 1 CBV 3 SL CBV 2
N/2 24 45 21 26 30 37
Stake 10 5 100 100 3.90 100
Offers
Mean 24 24 25 33 43 45
Mode 30 0 50 50 50 50
Median 25 20 20 45 50 50
St. Dev. 17.68 20.44 19 20 16.17 12
Table 3
Summary statistics of dictator game offers (in % of the U.S. $ stake) for N/2 subject
pairs in SL as well as reported in selected previous studies.
report offers made by standard college student subjects which tend to be in318
the region of 23-24% of the stake (see also Hoffman et al. 1996, Cason and319
Mui 1998), although some studies, such as Schotter et al. (1996), have found320
offers close to 40%. Of particular interest to us is the study by CBV, who321
identified marked differences in DG offer levels based on age and experimental322
location (bottom panel of figure 4). In their study, they compare offers made323
by students (average age: 19 years) in standard college settings (CBV 1), by324
older community college students (27, CBV 2) and by workers in a warehouse325
setting (37, CBV 3).326
The data show the DG offers made by SL-subjects to be higher than those327
reported in standard college settings, but similar to those made by older sub-328
jects in CBV. These results reflect the greater average age of our subjects (see329
section 3.7) and the fact that DG-offers are sensitive to age (Harbaugh et al.,330
2003). Previous and current DG-results pertaining to older subjects are shown331
in the bottom panel in figure 4. It is also noteworthy that in our experiment,332
proposers communicated their offers to the experimenter directly using pri-333
vate IM rather than using forms collected and delivered in stacks by monitors334
as tends to be practiced in physical locations. Our treatment provides more335
scope for social influence and demand effects that would be expected to raise336
offers.337
The age similarity between warehouse workers in CBV 3 to our own SL-338
subjects provides us with an appropriate benchmark for the comparison of339
DG-behaviour. No statistically significant differences were found between the340
means (t=-0.700, p=0.485) medians (U=981.5, p=0.823) and distributions341
(Z=0.383, p=0.999) of DG offer data in these two pools.342
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3.4 Public Good Game343
The PGG sessions were conducted on 25 October and 2 November 2007. In344
them, subjects in groups of n = 4 were asked to divide a stake of L$400 (U.S.345
$1.50) between a private and a group fund and explained that their total earn-346
ings would be their private allocation plus a = 0.4 times the total of all group347
allocations. This was repeated r = 10 times. The parameter values for n, r348
and α were chosen with comparability with other studies in mind (see table 4).349
The PGG is a n-person version of the prisoner’s dilemma and pits subjects’350
self-serving motives against their desire to further the benefit of the group.351
Instrumentally-rational play involves complete free-riding and allocating the352
whole endowment to the private fund. In repeated PGGs, players decisions353
may be guided both by strategic considerations of reciprocation and purely354
altruistic motives. A large literature exists that identifies the experimental355
conditions that elicit cooperative behaviour. In general, subjects contribute356
positive amounts to the public good that steadily decline as the game is re-357
peated. The studies reporting PGG games under standard conditions serve as358
benchmarks for the behaviour of our SL-subjects. We compare the behaviour359
of SL-subjects with those in experiments with comparable conditions reported360
by Andreoni (1988, 1995) (A (88) and A (95)) as well as Fehr and Ga¨chter361
(2000) (FG), who used values for parameter a of 0.5, 0.5 and 0.4 respectively.362
Table 4 reports summary statistics of SL-PGG behaviour compared to sub-363
jects in these three.364
The top panel in figure 5 shows the average contribution to the group fund365
subjects made in SL and in the three previous studies over ten rounds. SL-366
subjects contribute marginally more than subjects in the other pools in all367
rounds. The average contribution decays over rounds in similar ways in all368
studies. The higher average we find is not unusual within the context of find-369
ings made using variegated subject pools. For instance, Henrich et al. (2004)370
report on PGGs played with traditional society subjects in many continents371
and find mean contribution rates to vary between 22 and 65%. The SL sub-372
jects differ from standard college students in a number of ways, age being one.373
Our result may also be due to the apparent greater altruism of SL-subjects374
compared with students we observed in the DG.375
For our statistical tests of PGG behaviour, we chose A (95)’s Western student376
subject data as a benchmark. It should be borne in mind that this experiment377
differs from our study in two ways; the differences in experimental platform378
we are assessing, and the differences in subject demographics. We performed379
mean, median and distribution tests between the offers for each of the ten380
rounds played by A (95) and SL subjects (see table 5). Only one of the resulting381
thirty test statistics was significant (Zn=10 = 1.370, p=0.047). As the repeated382
testing procedure amplifies the probability of Type I errors, we also estimated383
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Fig. 5. Average subject decisions in GG and PGG over r=10 rounds in SL and
selected previous studies.
equation 1 to compare the two data sets. The factor n could not be entered384
due its insufficient variation in the data set. The regression results are given385
in table 6 and show an insignificant coefficient for X, leading us to conclude386
that no behavioural differences are in evidence.387
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A (88) A (95) FG SL
N 30 40 24 32
n 5 5 4 4
r 10 10 10 10
Stake 0.50 0.60 0.86 1.50
α 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
Contributions
Mean 33.20 44.09 37.94 50.34
Median 32.00 42.50 40.25 45.63
St. Dev. 21.65 27.47 16.89 22.54
Table 4
Summary statistics of public good game contributions (in % of the U.S. $ stake
averaged over r rounds) for N subjects playing in groups of n in SL as well as
reported in selected previous studies. Stakes are given as U.S.$-values of tokens
subjects were asked to allocate per round.
3.5 Minimum Effort Game388
The MEG sessions were conducted between 16 and 21 November 2007. In389
them, groups of n = 5 to 6 subjects were asked to choose an integer in the390
interval [1, 7] and informed that payoffs would be determined by the smallest391
number chosen within the group according to the payoff matrix adapted from392
Van Huyck et al. (1990) (VBB) and shown in table 7. Each group played ten393
rounds of this game. Again, these parameter values are standard to the extent394
that they have been adopted by the majority of previous studies. The game395
has multiple equilibria in which all players make the same choice, which payoff396
dominate each other in turn with a unique Pareto-efficient equilibrium in every397
player choosing 7. The game represents situations where a group’s ability to398
coordinate on the individually as well as collectively best outcome may be399
undermined by individuals’ pessimistic expectations of others’ reasoning. A400
typical example is punctuality (Camerer, 2003). While everyone arriving on401
time for a meeting is mutually the best outcome, an individual may arrive late402
to avoid a wait expecting others to also be late. After a number of meetings,403
such expectations may become increasingly self fulfilling as general punctuality404
disintegrates. Previous experimental evidence shows this kind of convergence405
on payoff-dominated outcomes to be dependent on the size of the group, the406
size of payoffs and information players receive about the choices of others.407
Figure 6 shows the round-to-round changes in the choices and minimum408
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Task r t MW U KS Z
PGG 1 0.431 (0.667) 619.0 (0.808) 1.054 (0.216)
2 0.499 (0.619) 611.5 (0.743) 0.949 (0.329)
3 0.864 (0.391) 572.0 (0.436) 0.764 (0.603)
4 1.231 (0.223) 536.5 (0.235) 1.001 (0.269)
5 0.697 (0.488) 567.0 (0.403) 0.817 (0.517)
6 1.231 (0.222) 534.5 (0.227) 0.870 (0.436)
7 0.673 (0.503) 573.5 (0.446) 0.738 (0.648)
8 0.568 (0.572) 544.5 (0.274) 1.370 (0.047**)
9 0.372 (0.711) 567.5 (0.405) 0.817 (0.517)
10 0.926 (0.358) 539.5 (0.240) 1.133 (0.153)
MEG 1 1.482 (0.141) 982.5 (0.139) 0.895 (0.452)
2 1.218 (0.226) 1023.0 (0.236) 0.833 (0.491)
3 1.927 (0.057) 931.0 (0.070*) 1.109 (0.171)
4 2.660 (0.009***) 822.5 (0.011**) 1.353 (0.051*)
5 1.449 (0.150) 986.0 (0.153) 0.713 (0.690)
6 1.382 (0.170) 990.0 (0.162) 0.983 (0.289)
7 1.571 (0.119) 955.5 (0.102) 0.888 (0.409)
8 0.785 (0.435) 1059.0 (0.351) 0.951 (0.326)
9 0.518 (0.606) 1073.5 (0.406) 1.042 (0.228)
10 2.364 (0.020**) 841.0 (0.014**) 1.347 (0.053*)
GG 1 1.798 (0.078*) 219.0 (0.079*) 0.928 (0.355)
2 0.091 (0.928) 305.0 (0.923) 0.478 (0.976)
3 2.195 (0.033**) 212.5 (0.060*) 1.226 (0.099*)
4 -1.090 (0.281) 268.5 (0.423) 0.821 (0.510)
5 1.003 (0.321) 289.5 (0.692) 0.664 (0.771)
6 0.032 (0.974) 280.5 (0.569) 0.703 (0.706)
7 0.538 (0.593) 283.0 (0.602) 0.664 (0.771)
8 -0.552 (0.583) 278.5 (0.543) 0.652 (0.788)
9 2.107 (0.041**) 250.5 (0.250) 1.277 (0.077*)
10 0.279 (0.781) 292.5 (0.735) 1.063 (0.209)
Table 5
Test statistics for differences in mean (t), median (U) and distribution (Z) of be-
haviour between SL subjects and those in selected previous studies for r=10 rounds.
Corresponding p-values are given in parentheses. The symbols *, ** and *** denote
significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
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PGG Estimate t-value p-value
Constant 14.24 6.39 0.000***
Yt−1 0.67 22.63 0.000***
X -2.47 -1.15 0.252
R2 (adj.)= 0.45 F= 260.69 p=0.000***
MEG Estimate t-value p-value
Constant 1.22 1.36 0.17
Yt−1 0.61 24.03 0.000***
n 0.06 0.43 0.664
X -0.34 -2.12 0.034**
R2 (adj.)=0.39 F=204.55 p=0.000***
GG Estimate t-value p-value
Constant 26.84 11.38 0.000***
Yt−1 0.25 8.09 0.000***
n -1.11 -2.82 0.005**
X -1.36 -0.81 0.416
R2 (adj.)=0.09 F=30.42 p=0.000***
Table 6
Regression results for experimental behaviour across three tasks in SL and one
comparator study respectively. The symbols *, ** and *** denote significance at
the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.
choices averaged over experimental groups in SL and comparable previous409
studies of Knez and Camerer (1994) (KC), Bornstein et al. (2002) (BGN),410
Devetag (2005) (DT) and VBB. Table 8 reports summary statistics of SL-411
PGG behaviour compared to subjects in these studies. All these studies used412
VBB’s payoff matrix and had groups between 5-7 subjects except VBB, which413
had groups of 14-16. The figure shows similar declines in choices in all these414
studies. On the other hand, there appears to be greater variability in the over-415
all level of average choices, with SL-averages appearing higher than those in416
other studies.417
We used the data reported by DT for the comparison with SL-observations.418
In terms of means, medians and distributions for r=10 rounds, round four419
and ten behaviours were different in terms of all three at the 10%-level of420
significance (see table 5). With one exception (Un=3 = 931.0, p = 0.070), the421
other twenty-four tests were negative, suggesting no differences exist in the422
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Fig. 6. Average and average minimum MEG choices over r=10 rounds in SL and
selected previous studies.
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Smallest choice in group
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 390 330 270 210 150 90 30
6 - 360 300 240 180 120 60
5 - - 330 270 210 150 90
4 - - - 300 240 180 120
3 - - - - 270 210 150
2 - - - - - 240 180
1 - - - - - - 210
Table 7
MEG payoff matrix (in L$). The first column represents player choices which, com-
bined with the smallest choice in the group, determines payoffs. Dashes denote
logically impossible outcomes.
VBB KC BGN DT SL
N 107 30 42 77 31
n 14-16 6 7 7 5-6
r 10 5 10 14 10
Stake 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.82 1.46
Choices
Mean 2.72 2.87 3.65 3.75 4.44
Median 2.50 2.80 2.40 3.60 4.60
St. Dev. 1.30 1.07 1.34 1.57 1.51
Table 8
Summary statistics of minimum effort game choices over r rounds for N subjects
playing in groups of n in SL as well as reported in selected previous studies. Stakes
are given as U.S.$-value of payoff associated with unique Pareto-efficient outcome.
rounds concerned. Again, we regressed equation 1 for the combined data set423
(table 6). The results show that at the 95% significance level, our data are424
different to those of DT as the coefficient for X is significant (p = 0.034). It425
should be noted that the same model also yields differences between the data426
of DT and BGN (p = 0.084) as well as between SL and BGN (p = 0.002). As a427
result, for the MEG, these findings do not provide firm conclusions about the428
ability of virtual world experimentation to replicate laboratory results. The429
two comparator experiments differ from ours in an additional, demographical430
dimension and also differ from each other in terms of results. The reason may431
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lie in greater general variability in MEG-behaviour due to the presence of432
multiple equilibria.433
3.6 Guessing Game434
The GG sessions were conducted on 8 and 15 November 2007. In them, n=3435
to 7 subjects were asked to choose integers in the interval [0,100] and informed436
that the subject with a response closest to g = 0.7 times the average of all437
choices would receive L$200 (U.S. $0.75). Ties were resolved by dividing this438
sum among the winners. Each group of subjects played r = 10 rounds of this439
game.440
The GG (sometimes known as the beauty contest game) is used as a tool to441
identify what levels of reasoning subjects employ in strategic thinking (Nagel,442
1995; Duffy and Nagel, 1997; Camerer, 1997). A zero-order (i.e. unstrategic)443
player may choose randomly or use a focal point such as the median of the444
interval (50 in our case). First-order choosers may take others into consider-445
ation but assume these to be of order 0. An optimal first-order choice would446
be in the interval [0,70] accounting for the impossibility of the group average447
to exceed 70. In particular, a choice of 35 (0.7×50) may reflect a belief that448
zero-order guessers choose 50 on average. Second-order players who assume449
others to use order 1 will not choose above 49 (0.7×70), and may opt for 25450
(0.7×35) believing order 1 choices to average 35 and so forth. The iterative451
application of increasingly higher levels of reasoning will eventually yield an452
equilibrium choice of 0.453
The average and distribution of GG-choices therefore provides insights not454
only to what levels of reasoning subjects use, but also what levels they at-455
tribute to others. Equilibrium choices may reflect higher orders of reasoning456
but be ineffective when other players operate at lower levels. In addition, re-457
peated GGs show to what extent subjects learn to adjust their choices on the458
basis of previous rounds’ results. Table 9 shows statistics concerning subjects’459
choices in single or first rounds of repeated games played in groups of differ-460
ent sizes with a parameter g = 0.7. The Singaporean student data are from461
10-round GG-experiments reported in Ho et al. (1998) (HCW). The HCW 1462
pool consisted of 3-player groups playing the game for the first time. Subjects463
in HCW 2 also played in 3-player groups but had experience of one previous464
game with a different g-value. Finally, HCW 3 was composed of inexperienced465
7-subject group players. In all HCW-treatments, the winning subject received466
50 Singapore cents (ca. U.S.$ 0.34). The U.S. study of Kovalchik et al. (2005)467
(KCGPA) compares one-round choices by college students (KCGPA 1) with468
those of mentally healthy senior citizens with an average age of 82 (KCGPA469
2). Our experimental settings of group size, g-value and repetition are the470
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Subjects Mean Median St. Dev. % 0 N
Caltech students 21.88 23.00 10.35 0.07 27
Portfolio managers 24.31 24.35 16.15 0.08 26
Economics PhDs 27.44 30.00 18.69 0.13 16
U.S. high school students 32.45 28.00 18.61 0.04 52
College students (KCGPA 1) 35.00 35.00 12.86 0.00 51
Singaporean students (HCW 1) 36.45 35.00 24.28 0.00 21
German students 36.73 33.00 20.21 0.03 67
Senior citizens (KCGPA 2) 37.00 33.00 17.46 0.00 50
University CEOs 37.81 36.50 18.92 0.03 73
Wharton students 37.92 35.00 18.84 0.00 35
Singaporean students (HCW 3) 39.78 35.00 25.46 0.02 49
SL 50.00 56.00 27.10 0.00 31
Singaporean students (HCW 2) 58.27 50.00 26.98 0.05 21
Table 9
Summary statistics for round 1 GG choices in n-subject pools in SL as well as
reported by Camerer (2003), Camerer (1997) and Kovalchik et al. (2005). The per-
centage of subjects choosing 0 is given by %0.
same as in HCW 1, which is most useful for a direct comparison.471
SL first round choices are relatively high (especially compared to our bench-472
mark HCW 1) but by no means outside the range of previous results. The bot-473
tom panel in figure 5 shows mean choices over ten rounds among SL-subjects474
and Singaporean students (HCW). Table 9 reports summary statistics of SL-475
GG behaviour compared to subjects in this study. Our subjects did appear to476
converge towards the equilibrium at similar rates to the latter. The frequency477
distribution of individual SL-choices over all ten rounds is displayed in figure 7,478
along with the corresponding data for HCW 1 reported in Ho et al. (1998)(p.479
955, figure 2E). Both distributions are similar in that a greater proportion480
of choices are low in later rounds. The SL-data appear different mainly in481
the more equal distribution in early rounds. However, towards the end of the482
game, the distributions are more similar, reflected in the convergence of curves483
in figure 5.484
GG data generally show divergence in first-round average choices. Part of the485
reason may be the role that players’ common knowledge of rationality has in486
equilibrium reasoning. Lower choices are not merely associated with greater487
strategic sophistication among players, but also with greater expectations con-488
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Fig. 7. Subject choice frequency distributions over r=10 rounds (group size 3, p=0.7)
in HCW 1 and SL.
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cerning the sophistication of others. Groups that are more sophisticated as well489
as more uniformly so, such as Caltech students, may therefore be expected to490
exhibit lower choices than comparatively heterogeneous groups such as SL491
where little is known about others who take part. Our first-round results may492
have not been much different had our pool consisted of anonymous and mutu-493
ally unaware game theorists disguised by avatars. The fact that SL-subjects’494
learning resulted in similar final-round choices supports this possibility. The495
anonymity of SL, potentially subverting the common knowledge of rationality,496
may therefore partly explain any differences in round one choices in SL.497
We compared the means, medians and distributions of SL choices with HCW498
1 over r=10 rounds (see table 5). Rounds 1, 3 and 9 show differences in499
all three dimensions. In total, seven of the thirty tests were positive, most500
only at the 10%-significance level. Table 6 shows the regression results for501
equation 1 pooling SL data with HCW 1 and 3. The latter study was not used502
for the tests as its larger subject group size rendered it inappropriate for a503
direct comparison; however, we were able to control for that difference using504
variable n in the regression. The results show an insignificant coefficient for505
X (p = 0.416). We conclude differences are not in evidence between the data506
sets.507
3.7 Universal Human Values508
In order to assess whether an idiosyncratic cultural environment exists within509
SL, we administered the ESS human values survey. This survey is based on510
Schwartz’s portrait values questionnaire, a well-tested instrument for identi-511
fying ten universal value dimensions (listed in figure 8). An individual’s scores512
are calculated on the basis of responses on a 6-point Likert scale indicating513
own similarity with 21 hypothetical value portraits. Subjects completed the514
survey on a webform immediately after the decision task stage of the session.515
Upon completion, each subject was paid L$1000 (ca. U.S. $3.85) for the survey516
in addition to the pay-outs from the decision task.517
Again, a host of existing data for this survey generates scope for compar-518
ing SL-subjects with standard populations. Cultural and demographic factors519
may have an influence on economic behaviour as they shape an individual’s520
social interaction and socialisation into particular values. Values are therefore521
an important indicator of how representative particular subject pools are of522
the underlying population to which economic theory relates. We conducted523
the human values survey in order to ascertain to what extent SL-residents re-524
semble standard experimental subjects culturally. Figure 8 shows the average525
value orientations of our subjects compared with those of respondents of the526
2002-2003 ESS, as well as a standard sample of thirty-six UK university stu-527
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Fig. 8. Average orientations of ESS-respondents (ESS), SL and UK student subjects
(UKU) according to Schwartz’ ten value dimensions.
dents (UKU) we also administered the questionnaire to. The ESS randomly528
samples more than 1500 adults from each participating nation’s resident popu-529
lation. The students were UK nationals invited randomly by automated email530
from the experimental subject database maintained by the Centre for Decision531
Research and Experimental Economics. For comparative purposes, we follow532
the ESS practice of presenting averages of ipsative scores, i.e. an individual’s533
Likert-scale responses standardised in terms of his or her overall response av-534
erage and variance. Ipsatised scores for different value dimensions have the535
advantage of being comparable in terms of relative strength.536
Schwartz’ ten human values are shown along the horizontal axis of figure 8.537
They have established empirical interrelationships that are commonly used538
to reduce them to two basic dimensions shown along the two respective axes539
in figure 9. The first dimension, self-transcendence v. self-enhancement, en-540
compasses six values: hedonism, stimulation and self direction relative to tra-541
dition, conformity and security. The former three values express underlying542
motivations such as pleasure, sensuous gratification, excitement, novelty and543
independence, while the latter express respect and acceptance of norms, self-544
restraint and harmony. The remaining four universal values are contained in545
the the second dimension, openness to change v. conservatism. It weighs the546
values of universalism and benevolence against those of power and achieve-547
ment. The former two values express motivations including tolerance and care548
for the welfare of others, while the latter two encompass social status, personal549
success and dominance over others. Figure 9 plots nations and subject pools550
according to the two overall dimensions.551
Our survey data indicate that while SL-users’ value orientations differ from552
those of ESS-respondents, they do so to a lesser extent than those of the UK553
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Fig. 9. Average orientations of ESS-respondents by nationality, SL and UK student
subjects (UKU) according to Schwartz’ two composite value dimensions.
student subjects. The SL and student average value orientations correlate at554
90% with each other, and respectively at about 70 and 64% with the averaged555
overall ESS-orientation of EU respondents. By comparison, individual national556
samples within ESS correlate with the average EU-values profile at about557
94%. The graph shows a relatively small distance between randomly-sampled558
individuals from European nations to SL-users and UK students. The students559
place a greater importance on the factors underlying self-enhancement, as can560
be verified in figure 8. This is consistent with age effects found in previous value561
surveys comparing students and teachers (Schwartz, 2001). Another reason for562
the difference may lie in a slightly higher relative socio-economic background563
and educational potential of students. However, caution has to be exercised564
due to our small sample size.565
4 Methodological Discussion566
Our experience of conducting experiments in SL suggests a number of ad-567
vantages and disadvantages of virtual experimentation generally as well as568
practical steps to adapt the platform for experimental purposes.569
It was possible, with little organisation and preparation, to recruit subjects570
in situ in the numbers we could manage within the SL-interface. SL’s fea-571
tures make it simple to create and maintain a database of subjects for future572
use. On the other hand, this procedure is prone to biased sample selection573
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on the basis of choosing busy recruitment locations, of solicitation, in the574
recruitment language, time and institutional affiliation we used. In addition,575
the relative anonymity that avatars confer on subjects makes it difficult in576
practice to prevent financially-motivated repeat participation or the recruit-577
ment of unfit (tired or intoxicated) or non-eligible or non-targeted subjects.578
While these issues may not be completely resolvable, we attempted to miti-579
gate both repeat and unsuitable participation by disqualifying avatars using580
the following criteria. First, to avoid repeats, we excluded avatars who partici-581
pated previously, who were created after the first experimental session or who582
made unsolicited approaches to us. To avoid unsuitable participants, we also583
excluded avatars less than a month old and potentially insufficiently familiar584
with the SL-environment, avatars referred by previous subjects who may have585
prior knowledge of the task, and avatars representing users who appeared to586
be in an unfit state. An additional identity issue both in our and in other587
virtual world studies concerns the potential for a disparity between user and588
avatar characteristics. For many users, the attraction of SL consists of the589
potential for using an avatar to assume a new and different identity. While590
our study was designed to elicit the behaviour and values of users and not591
avatars, we cannot be certain to what extent this was practised by subjects592
responding through their avatars.593
Our demographical and values survey shows that virtual worlds provide oppor-594
tunities for recruiting subjects who are demographically more representative595
than university students. In addition, targeting particular types of individuals596
is possible within those groups represented in virtual worlds, such as partic-597
ular nations. Clearly, some groups are currently not sufficiently represented598
in virtual worlds, including individuals from smaller and traditional societies.599
However, the bias of SL towards industrialised nations is likely to change as600
economic development provides greater access to the Internet to more people601
worldwide.602
The relatively sophisticated SL-economy provides some scope for appropriate603
incentive mechanisms. In particular, SL has developed informal labour and604
product markets which generate incentivisable subjects as well as money or605
in-kind rewards that can be delivered easily. Many users regularly participate606
in paid online activities for returns which are modest compared with those of607
standard economic experiments. In addition, the developed markets for virtual608
objects provide alternative in-kind incentives.609
While the computerised interface of SL provides an economical experimental610
environment that is well suited for data generation, collection and storage, it611
also has certain disadvantages. Communicating with subjects using IM makes612
it difficult to deal with more than a handful per session. In addition, private IM613
makes it hard to detect collusive behaviour or conferring amongst subjects.614
While is it not possible to override the communication mechanisms of SL,615
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we developed virtual laboratory furniture that alerts the experimenter to the616
potential for clandestine communication between subjects (visible in figure617
2). In particular, upon entering the virtual laboratory, subjects were asked618
to sit in cubicles and to enter mouselook, a SL-mode under which avatars619
are restricted to frontal vision and where private IM is suspended, in line620
with standard experimental conditions. Once activated, the furniture indicates621
whenever a subject suspends the mouselook mode and is therefore able to use622
private IM. While this furniture assured discipline in practice, it is in theory623
possible for experts to circumvent such mechanisms. On the other hand, this624
requires not only significant expertise on the part of a subject, but matching625
skills of and prior collusion with another subject present in order to establish a626
clandestine communication channel. Another problematic issue is establishing627
subject trust in the experimenters. Because of the nature of virtual worlds,628
it is difficult to convince subjects of the genuine nature of the experiment629
and incentivisation. A further problem involves the potential for disruption630
of experimental sessions by other users. This, however, may be controlled by631
restricting access to the virtual laboratory.632
The absence of physical signals and presence in virtual worlds creates clear633
differences between virtual and physical experimental conditions. Virtual ex-634
periments preclude physical presence that may influence behaviour through635
involuntary non-verbal communication that reveals emotional states. In ad-636
dition, the potential for anonymity means that the social consequences of637
virtual behaviour are different to those in physical laboratories. These factors638
may limit the comparability of virtual and physical experimental results in639
many cases. Virtual experimentation is clearly not appropriate when physical640
phenomena are part of the experimental treatment, such as when the effect of641
face-to-face interactions is tested.642
5 Conclusion643
Despite the non-standard nature of the SL-subject pool and certain imper-644
fections of the experimental environment that it provides, we were unable to645
detect significant and systematic overall differences between their behaviours646
and those observed in traditional settings. In particular, given SL-users’ demo-647
graphics in terms of age and cultural background, behaviour closely matched648
expectations based on a host of existing experimental evidence for a range649
of five important games. These results suggest tentatively that virtual world650
economic phenomena are based on similar behavioural regularities observed651
in standard economic settings and can be tested experimentally within the652
virtual environment.653
In addition, there is a slightly lesser cultural and age bias within SL than654
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at the average university campus. Users’ values are more in line with those655
of general populations of economic agents. There was little evidence of users’656
niche interests or motivations generating an unsuitable subject pool. Our work657
therefore supports Yee (2006), whose study of virtual world demographics658
dispels the popular notion that they are predominantly the domain of a male,659
adolescent sub-culture with niche interests. His data indicate that usage and660
appeal are equally strong over gender and age groups as well as based more661
on general social motivations (such as relationship building) than escapism.662
It should be noted that our study was not designed to provide support for663
or against virtual world experimentation as a method in absolute terms. In-664
stead, we adopted a less ambitious research question regarding its ability to665
reproduce the results of traditional experimentation in physical laboratories666
with standard subjects. As a result, the absence of observed behavioural dif-667
ferences between the two environments does not necessarily make a case for668
virtual experiments per se, but rather suggests they may be a valid alterna-669
tive to traditional method, subject to similar methodological advantages and670
limitations. Conversely, the presence of such differences would not necessarily671
invalidate virtual experimentation to the extent that the standard physical672
laboratory method is not without imperfections. As a result, these method-673
ological issues remain and may benefit from renewed debate in the context of674
virtual experimentation.675
While the above suggests that virtual world experimentation has potential as676
an economical and practical alternative to standard laboratory experiments,677
there are certain disadvantages associated with virtual worlds as experimental678
platforms which suggest that their suitability depends on the type of experi-679
ment planned. For instance, studies that consider the effects of physical sig-680
nals or depend on recruiting specific types of subjects will find little value in681
virtual experimentation. On the other hand, suitably adapting experimental682
procedures to the virtual world environment makes it possible to effectively683
and cheaply recreate many standard decision tasks. In addition, virtual world684
users appear to constitute suitable subject pools to the extent that they dis-685
play many of the economic behaviours associated with standard subjects. The686
future development of this technology will further increase the sophistication687
of the virtual experimental platform.688
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